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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year, the Illinois courts addressed various
state and local government issues, including governmental immunities, rights and benefits of public employees, and the Illinois Constitution's home rule1 and special legislation 2 provisions. Although
the Illinois courts did not create any substantial changes in these
areas during the Survey year, the courts did resolve several unsettled issues concerning state and local government law.
Additionally, the Illinois General Assembly passed a number of
bills relating to state and local governments during the Survey year.
Among those were bills addressing Illinois Enterprise Zones and
workers compensation claims of public employees.
II.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Within the area of governmental immunities, the Illinois
Supreme Court considered the issues of tort immunity and sovereign immunity. The Illinois Supreme Court also addressed the issue of public entities' immunities from statutes of limitations.
A.

Tort Immunity

In Illinois, state and local governmental immunity from tort liability has its statutory basis in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the "Act"). 3 During
the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed two sections
of the Act. One of those sections provides that an insurance company which issues an insurance policy to a public entity cannot
deny liability based on the immunity of the insured public entity. 4
Under that section, a public entity effectively waives its immunity
defense when it is protected by an insurance policy which is issued
by a "company" and covers the alleged liability.'
In Antiporek v. Village of Hillside,6 the court narrowly construed
this provision of the Act. In Antiporek, the mother of a minor injured on property owned by the Village of Hillside (the "Village")
sued the Village for damages caused by the Village's alleged negligence. The plaintiff claimed that the Village had waived its immunity from tort liability because it was a member of the Inter1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6. See infra notes 191-222.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. See infra note 224.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 1-101 to 10-101 (1985).
Id. at para. 9-103(c).
Antiporek v. Village of Hillside, 114 Ill. 2d 246, 247, 499 N.E.2d 1307 (1986).
114 I11.2d 246, 499 N.E.2d 1307.
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governmental Risk Management Agency ("IRMA").7 IRMA, an
alternative to commercial insurance, is a risk management pool
designed for Illinois municipalities. 8
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and held that the Village of Hillside had not waived its immunity from liability for ordinary negligence by being a member of
IRMA. 9 The court relied on Beckus v. Chicago Board of Education, 10 which held that reservation of funds by a public entity for
self-insurance" does not constitute a waiver of tort immunity
under the Act. 12 The Illinois Supreme Court in Antiporek held
that the Village of Hillside's membership in IRMA was analogous
to self-insurance.13 Therefore, the membership
did not constitute a
4
waiver of immunities under the Act.'
The court's decision in Antiporek has the impact of furthering
the provision of governmental services in two ways. First, the court
preserved the concept of sovereign immunity. In today's litigious
society, the loss of this immunity would impede greatly the provision of traditional governmental services, including police, fire, and
park services. Second, the Antiporek court refused to present municipalities with the hard choice of selecting either sovereign immunity or membership in an intergovernmental risk management
agency. Membership in risk management agencies is one method
for municipalities to effectively spread the risks of tort claims
among the member municipalities. Risk spreading keeps costs and
risk levels low and permits the continued delivery of traditional
governmental services. Accordingly, the decision in Antiporek
7. Id. at 248, 499 N.E.2d at 1307.
8. Id. As members of IRMA, public entities which are too small to self-insure pool
their resources and risks in order to protect themselves from possible "fiscal disasters"
which might accompany extensive, non-immune liabilities. Id. at 247-48, 499 N.E.2d at
1307.
9. Id. at 252, 499 N.E.2d at 1309.
10. 78 Ill. App. 3d 558, 397 N.E.2d 175 (1st Dist. 1979).
11. Under self-insurance, a municipality pools its resources and bears all the risks.
Any awards or settlements are paid directly from that pool of governmental money. Antiporek, 114 Ill. 2d at 250, 499 N.E.2d at 1308.
12. Beckus v. Chicago Board of Education, 78 Ill. App. 3d 558, 561, 397 N.E.2d 175,
178 (1979). The Illinois Supreme Court in Antiporek noted that the Beckus ruling had
been confirmed subsequently by the legislature: "after the appellate court [in Beckus] had
distinguished between waiver by acquisition of insurance and nonwaiver by self-insurance, the General Assembly amended section 9-103 without making any changes based
on the Beckus distinction; this sequence strongly indicates that the appellate court has
captured our legislators' intent." Antiporek, 114 Ill. 2d at 249, 499 N.E.2d at 1308.
13. Antiporek, 114 I11.2d at 251-52, 499 N.E.2d at 1309.
14. Id. at 252, 499 N.E.2d at 1309.
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could have the impact of encouraging "risk management
agencies."
The second section of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act considered by the Illinois
Supreme Court during the Survey year provides that when a public
employee is involved in the "execution or enforcement of any law,"
he and his employer are immune from actions for ordinary negligence.' 5 The Illinois Supreme Court decided two cases concerning
this section and 16thus clarified its earlier decision in Arnolt v. City of

Highland Park.

In Arnolt, the court held that a police officer is not automatically
immune from tort actions against him and his employer for ordinary negligence merely because he was on duty when he caused the
injury.' Instead, the court ruled that the determination of immunity depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.1 8 The
court asserted that in order for the police officer to be protected by
the Act, he clearly must be involved "in the execution or enforcement of any law."' 9 The Arnolt case, however, left unanswered the
issue of what conduct would constitute "the execution or enforce20
ment of any law."

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court in Thompson
v. City of Chicago,21 attempted to clarify this matter. In Thompson,
the plaintiff was struck and injured by the defendant police officer's
car as the officer backed it away from an unruly crowd. 22 The officer, who had been trying to disperse the crowd by moving the car
slowly forward, reversed when the crowd began pelting the car
with bottles, rocks, and debris. 23 The plaintiff was injured while the
officer was driving his car in reverse. The plaintiff argued that
although the police officer was enforcing the law when he drove
forward, he ceased enforcing the law when he backed up and in-

24
jured the plaintiff.

The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed and held that the enforcement of a law is rarely a single act, but is instead a "course of
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, paras. 2-105, 2-202 (1985).
52 Ill.
2d 27, 282 N.E.2d 144 (1972).
Id. at 33, 282 N.E.2d at 147.
Id. at 35, 282 N.E.2d at 149.
Id. at 33, 282 N.E.2d at 147.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, para. 2-202 (1985).
108 Ill. 2d 429, 484 N.E.2d 1086 (1985).
Id. at 430, 484 N.E.2d at 1087.
Id. at 431, 484 N.E.2d at 1087.
Id. at 433, 484 N.E.2d at 1087-88.
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conduct."25 The court reasoned that the police officer, in retreating, had not abandoned his attempt to enforce the law, but was still
engaged in a "course of conduct" directed toward remedying a
breach of the peace.2 6 Therefore, the supreme court held a directed
verdict for the defendant police officer, based on immunity for ordinary negligence as provided in the Act, was proper.
In the subsequent case of Fitzpatrick v. City of Chicago,28 the
Illinois Supreme Court was presented with a case analagous to
Thompson. In Fitzpatrick,a police officer had parked his squad car
alongside an expressway, at the scene of an accident in which the
plaintiff had been involved. 29 The plaintiff was injured when the
parked squad car, after being struck by another vehicle, was
pushed into him.3"
In directing a verdict for the defendant police officer and his employer, the court explained that the Act is not limited to only negligent acts concerning the enforcement or execution of a law. 3 '
Citing Thompson, the court reaffirmed its prior holding that the
"execution or enforcement of any law" suggests a "course of conduct." When the police officer was investigating the accident, the
Fitzpatrick court reasoned he was engaged in enforcing the traffic
laws and was therefore, along with his employer, protected from
suit under the Act.32
Read together, the Thompson and Fitzpatrick cases reach a
workable result, fostering the efficient administration of government services. The holdings in Thompson and Fitzpatrick will promote the delivery of police services.
B.

Sovereign Immunity

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
the issue of sovereign immunity.33 In Illinois, the State cannot be
made a party in any suit except as provided in the Court of Claims
Act (the "Act"). 34 The Act grants the Court of Claims exclusive
25. Id.
26. Id. at 434, 484 N.E.2d at 1088.
27. Id.
28. 112 Il1. 2d 211, 492 N.E.2d 1292 (1986).
29. Id. at 215, 492 N.E.2d at 1293.
30. Id. at 215, 492 N.E.2d at 1293-94.
31. Id. at 221, 492 N.E.2d at 1296.
32. Id. at 221-22, 492 N.E.2d at 1296.
33. According to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State or one of its departments can never be made a defendant in any action brought in the circuit court. Moline
Tool Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 410 Ill. 35, 37, 101 N.E.2d 71, 72 (1951).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 801 (1985).
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jurisdiction to hear claims against the State of Illinois.35
In Smith v. Jones,36 the plaintiffs were winning number holders
in the Illinois State Lottery's "Lotto" game.37 They alleged that
the Lottery and its director had breached their contract with the
plaintiffs by advertising a grand prize for that week
for a substan38
tially larger amount than actually was awarded.
The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the case and held that the
circuit court had been without subject matter jurisdiction due to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 39 The court determined that
although there are exceptions 4° to the law prohibiting suits against
the State in the circuit courts, the plaintiff's allegations merely
claimed a breach of contract by the Illinois State Lottery and its
director and, therefore, did not constitute an exception. 4 '
C. Limitations Immunity
According to common law, public entities, including state and
local governments, are immune from statutes of limitations when
they assert the rights of the public at large.4 2 In County of DuPage
v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White,43 the Illinois Supreme Court
considered whether this common law rule was applicable to actions
arising from building construction disputes in light of a statute setting the time during which a "body politic" could bring an action." The court held that the action filed by the County of
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 439.8 (1985).
36. 113 Ill. 2d 126, 129, 497 N.E.2d 738, 739 (1986).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 129-30, 497 N.E.2d at 739. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the
Lottery advertised a grand prize pool of $1,750,000.00. The grand prize award, however,
amounted to only $744,471.00. Id. at 129, 497 N.E.2d at 739.
39. Id. at 134, 497 N.E.2d 741. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
40. Smith v. Jones, 113 Ill. 2d at 131, 497 N.E.2d at 740. An exception to the sovereign immunity bar from actions against state officials acting in their official capacity exists
where the "complaint alleges that [a state] official is enforcing an unconstitutional law or
violating a law of Illinois thus acting beyond his authority." Id. In Smith, the plaintiffs'
complaint failed to allege that the director was enforcing an unconstitutional law. Id. at
132, 497 N.E.2d at 740-41. Also, the director was not violating any law by awarding an
amount less than that advertised. Id.
41. Id. at 134, 497 N.E.2d at 741.
42. City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 96 Ill. 2d 457, 459, 451 N.E.2d
874, 877 (1983).
43. 109 Ill. 2d 143, 485 N.E.2d 1076 (1985).
44. Id. at 147, 485 N.E.2d at 1078 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214
(1985)). The statute provides "[a]s used in this Section, 'person' means any individual,
any business or legal entity, or any body politic." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214
(1985). The statute further provides that all actions against parties for acts or omissions
related to construction must be commenced within two years from when the "person"
bringing the action knew or should have known of the act or omission. Id.
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DuPage was subject to the statute's limitations period.4"
The court in Graham held that section 13-214 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure, 46 which provides that the limitations period is applicable to "any body politic," is unambiguous and specifically designed to apply to public entities. 4 Thus, common law
governmental limitations immunity will not bar the opposing
party's use of a limitations defense based on that section of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.48
III.

MUNICIPAL ISSUES

The Illinois courts addressed a variety of issues of special interest to municipalities during the Survey year. Those issues included
municipal ordinances preventing public nuisances and mandating
sewer connections, municipalities' authority over park districts,
marriage license fees, local option 9 referenda, and potential liability of a municipality due to negligent enforcement of certain
ordinances.
A.

Nuisance Ordinances

One of the most publicized cases the Illinois Supreme Court decided during the Survey year was Chicago National League Ball
Club v. Thompson.50 In that case, the Chicago National League
Ball Club (the "Cubs") challenged the constitutionality of a Chicago city ordinance" and an Illinois statute.52 Both laws had the
effect of prohibiting night baseball at Wrigley Field, the Cubs' exclusive home playing field.53
45. Graham, 109 Ill. 2d at 143, 153-54, 485 N.E.2d at 1080. Although the court held
that the county's action was subject to the limitations period, the case was remanded to
determine when the statute of limitations began to run against the county's claim. Id. at
154, 485 N.E.2d at 1081.
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214 (1985).
47. Graham, 109 Ill. 2d at 152, 485 N.E.2d at 1080.
48. Id. at 153, 485 N.E.2d at 1080.
49. Local option is "[a]n option of self-determination available to a municipality or
other governmental unit to determine a particular course of action without specific approval from state officials." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (5th ed. 1979).
50. 108 Ill. 2d 357, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985).
51. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 104.1, § 14.1 (1983). The ordinance prohibits athletic contests between 8:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. in playing fields which are not
totally enclosed and contain more than 15,000 seats where any seats are located within
500 feet of 100 or more dwelling units. Id.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 1025 (1985). The statute provides that professional nighttime sporting events in a city of more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, in a stadium
at which such events were not played prior to July 1, 1982, are subject to nighttime noise
emission regulations of the Illinois Pollution Control Board. Id.
53. Chicago National League, 108 Ill. 2d at 363, 483 N.E.2d at 1248.

690
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The court upheld both the statute and the ordinance,54 ruling
that neither violated the separation of powers or due process constitutional principles. 55 The court reasoned that the legislature and
the City of Chicago have the authority to protect the public56interest by abating public nuisances, including intolerable noise.
Furthermore, the court held that the statute and ordinance did
not violate the Illinois Constitution's provision against special legislation 57 or the equal protection clauses of the state or federal constitution.58 The court in Chicago National League reasoned that
the legislation was not arbitrary or discriminatory. Instead, the
court held that it was reasonably related to the legitimate governresidents in a densely popumental interest of protecting nearby
59
lated area from a public nuisance.

B. Zoning Ordinances
Another question relating to municipal law decided by the Illinois Supreme Court during the Survey year was whether a park
district is immune from the zoning ordinances of its host municipality. In Wilmette Park District v. Village of Wilmette, 6° the park
district claimed that it was not subject to Wilmette's zoning ordinance. Consequently, the park district argued that it did not have
to apply for a special use permit or participate in a special use hearing prior to installing new lights on it's property.61
The Illinois Supreme Court, in affirming the appellate court's
decision, held that the park district could not disregard the zoning
ordinance of its host municipality.62 The court stressed the interest
in intergovernmental cooperation. The court concluded that the
Village of Wilmette's requirement that the park district attend a
special use hearing for permit requests was not only a reasonable
54. Id. at 365, 483 N.E.2d at 1252.
55. Id. at 365-66, 483 N.E.2d at 1248-49. The Cubs argued that the statute and
ordinance violated separation of powers and due process principles because each "declare[d] as law the conclusive presumption that night baseball at Wrigley Field alone
constitutes a private nuisance." Id. at 364, 483 N.E.2d at 1248. Such a determination,
the Cubs claimed, should have been made following a civil suit wherein an aggrieved
party alleged a private nuisance. The Cubs asserted that a civil suit would have provided
rights to discovery and cross-examination as well as an opportunity to defend. Id.
56. Id. at 364-65, 483 N.E.2d at 1248-49.
57. Id. at 367-72, 483 N.E.2d at 1250-52. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. See infra
note 224.
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
59. Chicago NationalLeague, 108 Ill. 2d at 369-372, 483 N.E.2d at 1252.
60. 112 Ill. 2d 6, 490 N.E.2d 1282 (1986).
61. Id. at 10, 490 N.E.2d at 1283.
62. Id. at 15, 490 N.E.2d at 1287.
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requirement, but also an opportunity for the Village and the park
district to reconcile their competing interests.6 a
In Wilmette Park District, the court ruled in favor of intergovernmental cooperation and efficiency. The court reasoned that it is
more efficient for service districts to know in advance that they are
subject to zoning and other restrictions of their host municipalities
than for the parties to litigate each time a proposed district activity
conflicts with the host municipality's ordinance.
C. Licensing Fees
The Illinois Supreme Court in recent years has considered the
issue of whether fees may be imposed on certain local governmental administrative proceedings in order to fund remotely related
state services. " In the 1984 case of Crocker v. Finley,65 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the use of a five-dollar filing fee paid by
parties seeking dissolution of marriage for the funding of domestic
violence shelters was an unconstitutional violation of due process
guarantees.66
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court in Boynton
v. Kusper6 7 reaffirmed its prior decision in Crocker. In Boynton, the
dispute concerned a state statute that required a portion of marriage license fees to be deposited with the county treasurer for
eventual deposit into the State Treasury's Domestic Violence Shelter and Service Fund.6 8 The court held the fee was a violation of
due process.69
In its analysis, the Illinois Supreme Court equated the additional
fee on the marriage license cost to a tax. Accordingly, the court
held that a rational relationship must exist between the purpose of
the tax and the taxed class in order for the tax to be constitutional.70 The Boynton court concluded, however, that the relationship between the purchase of a marriage license and domestic
violence is too remote to satisfy the rational-relationship test of due
process. 7
Moreover, the Boynton court held that the tax could not with63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 17, 490 N.E.2d at 1287.
See Crocker v. Finley, 99 I11.2d 444, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 456, 459 N.E.2d at 1352.
112 I11.2d 356, 494 N.E.2d 135 (1986).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2401-2403.1 (1985).
Boynton, 112 Ill. 2d at 362, 494 N.E.2d at 140.
Id. at 366, 494 N.E.2d at 139-40.
Id. at 366, 494 N.E.2d at 140.
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stand the strict scrutiny test of due process. The court reasoned
that because the right to marry is a fundamental right, the State
may not interfere with that right absent a compelling State interest.72 The court held that the State had failed to demonstrate that
it could not protect its interest in curbing domestic violence by any
other means.73
The Boynton case illustrates a restrictive view of the requirement
of a rational relationship between the tax's purpose and the taxed
class. This holding may suggest that courts will give greater scrutiny to all taxing measures.
D. Implied Statutory Authority
In Buffalo, Dawson, Mechanicsburg Sewer Commission v.
Boggs,74 the Illinois Supreme Court was presented with the issue of
whether a legislatively created commission had overstepped its implied statutory authority. In particular, the court in Buffalo considered whether the tri-city sewer commission was vested with
authority to enact an ordinance mandating sewer connection of
parties within the tri-city area.75 In holding that the commission
had such authority, the Buffalo court noted that the commission
was created for the purpose of planning and financing the common
sewer system.76 Also, the commission had the duty to establish
rates sufficient to cover the costs of operation and maintenance.77
The court reasoned that the commission could meet its objectives
only by collecting the established rates.78 Therefore, the Buffalo
court held the mandatory sewer connection ordinance was a necessary adjunct to the commission's statutory obligations.79
In Buffalo, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that a legislatively
created commission has authority to enact an ordinance mandating
sewer connection by all residents within the commission's district.8 ° In ruling for the commission, the court reasoned that the
commission should have all the authority necessary to meet its
statutory obligations.8
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 368-69, 494 N.E.2d at 140.
Id. at 370-71, 494 N.E.2d at 141.
109 Ill. 2d 397, 488 N.E.2d 258 (1985).
Id. at 399, 488 N.E.2d at 259.
Id. at 400, 488 N.E.2d at 259.
Id.
Id. at 400, 488 N.E.2d at 260.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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E.

Referenda Requirements

In the case of Walgreen Co. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
section 9-2 of the Illinois Liquor Control Act of 1934.83 Section 92 requires that voters of a precinct "in any city, village or incorporated town" who wish to pass upon the question of banning the
sale of liquor in a local referendum, must file a petition with the
clerk of the municipality with signatures of at least twenty-five percent of the municipality's or precinct's legally registered voters.84
In Walgreen Co., the controversy surrounded the validity of petitions gathered for a referendum to ban the sale of liquor in three
Chicago precincts.85
The circuit court held that section 9-2 violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and thus signatures of twenty-five percent of the voters
were unnecessary.86 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed that decision.87 The court held that because neither a fundamental right
nor a suspect class was involved, the statute was required only to
bear a rational relationship to the ends sought.88 Concluding that
the State had a strong interest in the economic stability of the liquor industry, the court held that section 9-2 did not violate equal
protection principles.8 9
F

Negligent Enforcement of Municipal Ordinances

Two appellate court cases decided this past Survey year addressed the potential liability of a municipality for the allegedly
negligent enforcement of a municipal code or ordinance. Both
cases relied upon the earlier Illinois Supreme Court decision in
Ferentchak v. Village of Frankfort.9°
In Ferentchak, the plaintiff homeowners in the Village of Frankfort sued the Village for damages to their home caused by flood82. 111 111. 2d 120, 488 N.E.2d 619, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 2911 (1986).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 167 (1985).
84. Id.
85. Walgreen Co., 111 Il1. 2d at 122, 488 N.E.2d at 981.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 127, 488 N.E.2d at 984.
88. Id. at 127, 488 N.E.2d at 983.
89. Id. The Walgreen Co. court also stated that whether the twenty-five percent signature requirement was wise or the best means to the desired end was not a proper subject for a court to investigate. The court asserted that the General Assembly could have
required sixty percent of the registered voters' signatures. Id. at 127, 488 N.E.2d at 98384.
90. 105 Ill. 2d 474, 475 N.E.2d 822 (1985).
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ing. 9 ' The flooding resulted from the low foundation grade level.
The low grade level, however, complied with the Village's minimum height regulation. 92 The plaintiffs argued that because the
Village's code administrator actively enforced the regulations while
the house was being built, the Village undertook a duty to protect
the plaintiffs from damages resulting from the low grade level.
Thus, the plaintiffs claimed that the Village was liable for the inadequate protection and resulting damage to the plaintiffs' home.93
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' contentions.94
The court stated that the Village was merely enforcing the Code's
minimum requirements, and in enforcing the Code, the Village did
not incur any legal duty to the plaintiffs. 9 Accordingly, the court
held that the Village was not liable to the plaintiffs for the flood
damage caused by the low grade level of their home's foundation.96
During the Survey year, the Illinois appellate courts considered
issues analogous to the issue presented in Ferentchak. In Swaw v.
Ortell, 97 the plaintiffs, homeowners in Tinley Park, sued the Village
of Tinley Park for negligence in enforcing its building codes. 98 A
number of serious defects in the structure and foundation were
present in the plaintiffs' house and the Village of Tinley Park had
been aware of the defects before the plaintiffs bought the house. 99
The plaintiffs alleged that because the Village had a duty to enforce
its building codes, it also had a duty to protect the plaintiffs from
defects discoverable through inspection."
The appellate court, citing Ferentchak, affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the complaint against the Village of Tinley
Park.101 The Swaw court held that a municipality owes no duty to
the public simply because it enforces its building codes. 102 Furthermore, because the Village did not undertake any additional duties
outside of its governmental function, the Village owed no special
duty to the plaintiffs.10 3 As a result, the court found that the Vil91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 476, 475 N.E.2d at 823.
Id.
Id. at 484, 475 N.E.2d at 827.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 485, 475 N.E.2d at 828.
137 Il1. App. 3d 60, 484 N.E.2d 780 (1st Dist. 1985).
Id. at 65, 484 N.E.2d at 784.
Id.
Id. at 67, 484 N.E.2d at 785.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 68, 484 N.E.2d at 785.
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lage of Tinley Park was not liable for the damage caused by the
structural defects in the plaintiffs' home."°
The second appellate court case decided during the Survey year
that presented an issue analogous to that in Ferentchak was
Fryman v. JMK/Skewer. !05 In Fryman, the plaintiffs sued the Peoria County Health Department for injuries due to contaminated
food from a restaurant that the health department had known was
serving contaminated food.'06
The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim
against the Peoria County Health Department.° 7 In affirming the
holding in Ferentchak, the court stated that a public entity is not
liable to the public for negligent enforcement of its laws. 08 Accordingly, the Fryman court held that the Peoria County Health
Department was not liable to the public for any injury caused by
its failure to enforce the county health ordinances."
IV.

RIGHTS AND BENEFITS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

A number of issues concerning the rights and benefits of public
employees arose during the Survey year. The Illinois Supreme
Court reviewed the manner in which certain pensions and civil service salaries are determined. The court also considered issues involving outside employment of deputy sheriffs. Additionally, the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District addressed an issue
involving collective bargaining agreements between municipalities
and their employees.
A.

Pensions

The Illinois Supreme Court considered the issue of judges' pensions in the case of Felt v. Board of Trustees."I In Felt, the court
analyzed the statutory amendment to section 18-125 of the Illinois
Pension Code,"' which changed the salary basis for computing retirement annuities of judges to the average salary for the final year
of service as a judge."12 Prior to the amendment, the retirement
annuities were based on two factors: the date of the judge's enroll104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
137 Ill. App. 3d 611, 484 N.E.2d 909 (3d Dist. 1985).
Id. at 614, 484 N.E.2d at 910.
Id. at 614, 484 N.E.2d at 911.
Id. at 615, 484 N.E.2d at 912.
Id.
107 Ill. 2d 158, 481 N.E.2d 698 (1985).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1081/2, para. 18-125 (1985).
Id.
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ment in the retirement system, and the salary of the judge on the
13
last day of judicial service.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the amendment, as applied
to the plaintiffs, was unconstitutional. 14 The alterations to the
plaintiffs' benefits were substantial. 1 15 Thus, the court determined
that applying the amendment retroactively violated the state constitutional prohibition against the diminution of retirement benefits116 and federal constitutional prohibitions against impairment
7
of contracts.1
Another question involving retirement benefits came before the
Illinois Supreme Court this Survey year in Braun v. Retirement
Board of the Firemen'sAnnuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago."8 The
issue in Braun concerned the proper interpretation of section 6-211
of the Illinois Pension Code. 9 The Illinois Pension Code provides
that pensions for firemen are based upon the actual annual salary
of the individual, excluding salaries paid to a fireman on temporary
assignment. 120 In Braun, the plaintiff fireman sought to have his
pension determined on the basis of his actual salary in the higher
paying unclassified positions he held prior to his retirement rather
12
than his salary at the highest civil service rank he attained. 1
While the case was pending in the appellate court, the Pension
Code was amended to provide that a fireman who held a position
at the will of the "Commissioner or other appointing authority"
was deemed to have held a temporary position. 122 The Braun court
determined that the plaintiff's unclassified positions fit into the
class described by the amendment. Therefore, the unclassified positions could not be used as the basis for determining the plaintiff's
pension.1 23 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff's pension would
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1081/2, para. 18-125 (1981), amended by ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 1081/2, para. 18-125 (1985).
114. Felt, 107 Ill. 2d at 168, 481 N.E.2d at 702.
115. Id. at 166, 481 N.E.2d at 700. The annuities were reduced by $3,187.44 for two
of the plaintiffs and $5,842.80 for another. Id. at 162, 481 N.E.2d at 700.
116. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5. Article XIII, section 5 provides in relevant part:
"Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State,... shall be an enforceable
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired."
117. Felt, 107 Ill. 2d at 168, 481 N.E.2d at 702 (1985). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10;
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
118. 108 Ill. 2d 119, 483 N.E.2d 8 (1985).
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1081/2, para. 6-211 (1985).
120. Id.
121. Braun, 108 Ill. 2d at 120-21, 483 N.E.2d at 9.
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1081/2, para. 6-211 (1985).
123. Braun, 108 Ill. 2d at 127-28, 483 N.E.2d at 12.
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be based on the highest civil service rank that he had attained. 124
The court determined that the retroactive effect of the amendment
did not violate the Illinois Constitution's guarantee against diminution of pensions. 12 The court reasoned that the amendment was
properly viewed as a clarification rather than a modification of the
existing code provisions and thus did not change the result or the
law. 126
B.

The Compensation Review Act

In the case of Quinn v. Donnewald,27 the Illinois Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of the Compensation Review Act
(the "Act"). 128 The Act establishes a Compensation Review Board
(the "Board") and authorizes the Board to recommend to the General Assembly the compensation for members of the General Assembly, judges, elected constitutional
officers, and certain
129
appointed officers of the State.
Procedurally, the Act requires that the Board file compensation
recommendations with the General Assembly. 130 The General Assembly then may vote to disapprove the recommendations in whole
or to reduce them.13 ' If a majority of both houses of the General
Assembly does not reject the recommendations, then the Board's
recommendations become law and the legislature appropriates the
32
necessary funds. 1
In Quinn, the plaintiffs as taxpayers, contended that the Act violated provisions of the Illinois Constitution requiring salaries of
such public officials be "provided by law."' 13 3 The plaintiffs also
alleged that the Act was prohibited by the Illinois Constitutional
provisions requiring both houses to vote on all laws. 134 Finally,
124. Id.
125. See supra note 116.
126. Braun, 108 Ill. 2d at 126-27, 483 N.E.2d at 11-12.
127. 107 Ill. 2d 179, 483 N.E.2d 216 (1985).
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 63, paras. 901-906 (1985).
129. Id. at para. 904.
130. Id.
131. Id. at para. 905. The General Assembly must act on the recommendations
within 30 days after the legislature convenes. Id.
132. Id. at paras. 905, 906.
133. Quinn, 107 Ill. 2d at 186, 483 N.E.2d at 219. See ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 11; ILL.
CONST. art. VI, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 21. Illinois Constitutional provisions require
that salaries of judges, legislators and executive officials shall be "provided" or "established" by law.
134. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(c). Article IV, section 8(c) provides in relevant part:
"No bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected
to each house. Final passage of a bill shall be by record vote. ..."
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they alleged that the Act violated the presentments135 and appointI as well as the law prohibiting legislative vetoes. 37
ments clauses, 13613
The court disagreed with each of the plaintiffs' allegations.
First, the court reasoned that the salaries were "provided by law"
because the Board merely made salary recommendations while the
General Assembly remained responsible for actually setting the
salaries. 138 Furthermore, the Quinn court held there was no violation of the constitutional provisions requiring passage by both
houses and presentment to the Governor because the Act established the salary recommendation procedure, was passed by both
houses, and was presented to the Governor.1 39 Moreover, an appropriations bill containing new salaries would have to be passed
by both houses and signed by the Governor." 4
Finally, the court reasoned that the Act did not violate the appointments clause because the appointments clause only prohibits
the General Assembly from appointing officers to the executive
branch. The court noted that the Board members were not officers
of the executive branch and therefore no violation of the appointments clause had occurred.' 4 ' Applying this reasoning, the court
also held that the Act did not constitute a legislative veto. Thus,
the Quinn court reasoned that the law prohibiting legislative vetoes 42 was inapplicable. The court reasoned that because the
Board's acts constituted a legislative, rather than an executive
function, the procedure authorized by the Act for disaffirming
a
43
veto.
legislative
illegal
an
constitute
not
did
recommendation
135. Id. at §§ 9(a), (b). Article IV, section 9(a) provides, in relevant part: "[e]very
bill passed by the General Assembly shall be presented to the Governor....If [he] approves
the bill, he shall sign it and it shall become law." Article IV, section 9(b) provides, in
relevant part: "[i]f the Governor does not approve the bill, he shall veto it by returning it
with his objections to the house in which it originated."
136. Id. at § 9(a). Article V, section 9(a) provides in relevant part: "[tihe Governor
shall nominate and . . . shall appoint all officers whose election or appointment is not
otherwise provided for .... The General Assembly shall have no power to elect or appoint officers of the Executive Branch."
137. See Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). A
legislative veto exists when the legislature delegates certain powers to the executive
branch, yet it retains the right to cancel an executive action that was based on that delegated power by means of a resolution. Id. at 923-26. The legislative veto device as used
by the United States House of Representatives was held unconstitutional. Id. at 959.
138. Quinn, 107 Ill. 2d at 186-87, 483 N.E.2d at 219 (1985).
139. Id. at 190, 483 N.E.2d at 222.
140. Id. at 190, 483 N.E.2d at 221-22.
141. Id. at 192, 483 N.E.2d at 222.
142. See supra note 137.
143. Quinn, 107 Ill. 2d at 192, 483 N.E.2d at 222.
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Sheriff's Merit System Act

In Schalz v. McHenry County Sheriff's Department Merit Commission,1" the plaintiffs, full-time deputy sheriffs in McHenry
County, challenged the authority of the Merit Commission (the
"Commission") 145 to promulgate rules restricting deputy sheriffs'
secondary employment.'4 Pursuant to its perceived rulemaking
authority under the Sheriff's Merit System Act,'4 7 the Commission
had enacted rules granting itself the authority to approve or disapprove requests by full-time deputy sheriffs to take secondary employment. 1 8 The plaintiffs argued that the Commission had no
such authority. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed.' 49 The court
noted that the Commission's authority arose from the Sheriff's
Merit System Act, which neither expressly nor impliedly grants the
Commission the authority to promulgate substantive rules of conduct for member of sheriffs' departments. Thus, the court held the
Commission had exceeded its authority when it promulgated rules
that attempted to regulate the outside employment of deputy
sheriffs.' 5 °
D.

Collective BargainingAgreements

During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District reviewed a collective bargaining agreement between the city of Quincy and some of its employees. In Lodge No.
822 v. City of Quincy,'51 Lodge No. 822, International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Union (the "Union"), representing all its members employed by the city of Quincy, sued the
144. 113 Ill. 2d 198, 497 N.E.2d 731 (1986).
145. The Sheriff's Merit Commission Act provides for the creation of a Sheriff's Office Merit Commission which has the duties "of certification for employment and promotion, and ... to discipline or discharge as the circumstances may warrant. All full-time
deputy sheriffs [are] under the jurisdiction of this Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 125, para.
157 (1985).
146. Schalz, 113 Ill. 2d at 199-200, 497 N.E.2d at 731 (1986). Specifically, the rules
provided that full-time deputy sheriffs who sought secondary employment first had to get
approval from the Sheriff. The Sheriff would then make his recommendations to the
Merit Commission which decided whether to permit the secondary employment. Also,
the rules prohibited full-time deputy sheriffs from performing any function that was usually of the Sheriff's Department for his or her own gain or in exchange for any "article of
value." Id. at 201, 497 N.E. 2d at 732.
147. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 125, para. 159 (1985).
148. Schalz, 113 Ill. 2d at 200-01, 497 N.E.2d at 732.
149. Id. at 206, 497 N.E.2d at 734.
150. Id.
151. 137 Ill. App. 3d 425, 484 N.E.2d 464 (4th Dist. 1985).
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city of Quincy to compel arbitration. 52 Specifically, the Union
claimed that Quincy's policy of replacing workers with temporary
employees violated the collective bargaining agreement's provision
requiring Quincy to notify the Union when an existing job classification was changed.153 Because of this alleged violation, the Union
claimed that Quincy was required to submit to arbitration to settle
the dispute. '54
The appellate court refused to compel the city of Quincy to arbitrate the dispute. 55 The reviewing court held that the grievance
did not require arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. 5 6 Moreover, the court noted that Quincy's policy of hiring
temporary employees was not subject to the collective bargaining
agreement's provision regarding changes in job classifications because these job classifications were not changed. 157 The court also
noted that a nexus between the dispute and the agreement's provisions was necessary for the court to consider the issue arbitrable.
The appellate court held that such a nexus was missing 58 and, ac59
cordingly, the Union was not entitled to arbitration.
V.

PUBLIC INTEREST

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced
with several issues of public interest. Among the issues the court
considered were abortion, public demonstrations, and the due process requirements for revoking drivers' licenses.
A. Abortion
The State Records Act (the "Act") 6° contains a provision requiring that reports and records of the "obligation, receipt and use
6
of public funds" be made available to the public for inspection.' 1
In Family Life League v. Department of Public Aid, 62 the Illinois
Supreme Court examined whether the Act requires the disclosure
of the names of providers of abortion services, the number of abor152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 425, 484 N.E.2d at 465.
Id. at 428, 484 N.E.2d at 466.
Id.
Id. at 431, 484 N.E.2d at 468.
Id.
Id. at 430, 484 N.E.2d at 467-68.
Id. at 431, 484 N.E.2d at 468.
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 116, paras. 43.4-.28 (1985).
Id. at para. 43.6.
112 Ill. 2d 449, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (1986).
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tions performed, and63the amounts paid for those services under the
Medicaid program.

The Department of Public Aid (the "Department") agreed that
the records at issue were within the purview of the Act. The Department argued, however, that the records should not be disclosed
because such disclosure would infringe upon the provider's and the
abortion recipient's right of privacy." The court rejected the Department's arguments and held that in this instance, the provider's
and recipient's right of privacy were not sufficiently strong to overcome the public's interest in knowing how its tax dollars are
spent. 65 The court stated that it would be unfair to presume that
making available the names of abortion providers would subject
66
them to harassment and thereby violate their right of privacy.
Because Medicaid funds are available for abortions only in instances when the mother's life is in danger, the court reasoned
that
67
harassment.
in
result
to
likely
least
were
abortions
such
The court in Family Life League also held that the Act did not
violate the abortion recipient's right of privacy, which protects a
woman's right to obtain an abortion. The court reasoned that it
was unlikely that abortion providers would discontinue such services simply because their names would be disclosed. Therefore,
disclosure of the providers' names under 68the Act would not diminish the recipient's choice of a provider.
As moneys for the providing of services by government and
quasi-governmental entities dwindle, it is unclear whether governments will be able to protect the rights of the recipients of those
benefits. As the needs competing for limited public funds grow in
number, the toll on certain basic freedoms may be great.
.

Public Demonstrations

Another public interest issue addressed by the Illinois Supreme
Court during the Survey year concerned the Illinois Public Demonstrations Law (the "Law").' 69 The Law provided that prior to
demonstrating on a public street, participants had to give notice to
"the principal law enforcement officer."' 170 The "principal law en163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 451-52, 493 N.E.2d at 1055-56.
Id. at 453, 493 N.E.2d at 1056.
Id. at 455-56, 493 N.E.2d at 1057-58.
Id. at 456, 493 N.E.2d at 1058.
Id.
Id. at 454-56, 493 N.E.2d at 1057-58.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 85-1 to -9 (1985).
Id. at para. 85-5.
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forcement officer" would then set a limit on the number of persons
permitted to participate in order to protect the public from unreasonable disruption of traffic and of police, fire, and emergency
services. ' 7'
In People v. Bossie, 172 the defendants were arrested during a
demonstration for nuclear disarmament and were charged with violating the Law.' 73 The demonstrators then challenged the constitutionality of the Law, claiming it violated their free speech and
assembly rights, and due process rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 1
The State contended the Law was a "constitutionally permissible
time, place, and manner restriction" on free expression. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, ruled to the contrary. 7 It held that
the term "the principal law enforcement officer," which was never
defined in the Law, was unconstitutionally vague 76 because a
person of ordinary intelligence would have to guess at its meaning. 177 Therefore, the court concluded, the Law violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and chilled first
amendment rights
by permitting "arbitrary and discriminatory
78
enforcement."1
74

C. Due Process In Revoking Drivers' Licenses
In People ex rel. Eppinga v. Edgar, 79 the Illinois Supreme Court
confronted the issue of whether a prehearing revocation of a
driver's license was a violation of due process guarantees. In Eppinga, the plaintiff caused a head-on collision in which the parties
in the other car were injured severely. 8 ° The plaintiff was arrested
and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol.' 8 ' Upon
certification of the incident by the State's Attorney, the Secretary
s2
of State revoked the plaintiff's driving privileges prior to trial.
171. Id. at paras. 85-2, -4.
172. 108 Il1. 2d 236, 483 N.E.2d 1269 (1985).
173. Id. at 238, 483 N.E.2d at 1269.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 239-42, 483 N.E.2d at 1270-71.
176. Id. at 242, 483 N.E.2d at 1271.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 241, 483 N.E.2d at 1271.
179. 112 Ill. 2d 101, 492 N.E.2d 187, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 314 (1986).
180. Id. at 103, 492 N.E.2d at 188.
181. Id.
182. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951A, para. 6-206(a)(1) (1985). Paragraph 6206(a)(1) provides in relevant part: "[t]he Secretary of State is authorized to suspend or
revoke the driving privileges of any person without preliminary hearing upon a showing... that such person: (1) Has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of
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The plaintiff argued that this revocation of his driving privileges
was a deprivation of property without due process of law, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment."8 3
The Illinois Supreme Court held that under the circumstances in
Eppinga, a prehearing revocation of the plaintiff's driving privileges did not constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law. s4 The court relied on the United States Supreme
Court cases of Dixon v. Love ' 85 and Mackey v. Montrym,18 6 both of
which involved revocation or suspension of a driver's license without a prior hearing. In Dixon and Mackey, the United States
Supreme Court reasoned that although the interest in a driver's
license and the interest in driving a motor vehicle are protected by
the fourteenth amendment, those interests are "not so great as to
require" a hearing prior to revocation. 187 Furthermore, considering
the safety hazard posed by drunk drivers, the State's interest in
highway safety is sufficiently strong. Thus, applying Dixon and
Mackey, the Eppinga court held that
a prehearing revocation did
188
not violate due process protections.
The court's decision in People ex rel. Eppinga v. Edgar may reflect the State's reaction to the nationwide intolerance for driving
under the influence of alcohol. The court impliedly ruled that this
interest in highway safety outweighs the interest in a driver's license and in driving an automobile. As drunk driving laws and
penalties become more severe nationwide, this case suggests that
Illinois will be equally strict.
a driver's license or permit is required upon conviction." See also ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit.
92, ch. II, § 1040.35 (1985). This section of the Code provides that when one commits an
offense such as driving under the influence and this offense results in serious bodily injury
or death, the driving record of the offender will be reviewed and his or her license may be
revoked. Id.
183. Eppinga, 112 Ill. 2d 101, 106, 492 N.E.2d 187, 189.
184. Id. at 110-11, 492 N.E.2d at 191.
185. 431 U.S. 105 (1977). In Dixon, the driver's license of the plaintiff was revoked
after being suspended three times within a ten year period. The Supreme Court balanced
the State's and licensee's interests and held that one's interest in a driver's license was
"not so great as to require" a prerevocation hearing, the risk of erroneous deprivation,
which could only happen through clerical error, was not great, and the government had a
strong interest in the procedure for revocation. Therefore, the prehearing revocation did
not violate due process. Id. at 113-15.
186. 443 U.S. 1 (1979). In Mackey, the plaintiff's driver's license was suspended for
the licensee's refusal to submit to a breath-analysis test. The Court followed the reasoning in Dixon. Id. at 11-12 (citing Dixon, 431 U.S. 105). See supra note 185.
187. Eppinga, 112 Ill. 2d 101, 110, 492 N.E.2d 187, 190-91.
188. Id.
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ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

During the Survey year, the state and local government issues
arising under the Illinois Constitution primarily addressed two
provisions of the Illinois Constitution. These provisions were the
home rule provision'89 and the special legislation provision.19°
A.

Home Rule

Home rule is a "constitutional provision or type of legislative
action which results in providing local cities and towns with a measure of self government if such local government accepts terms of
the state legislation."'' 91 In two cases decided during Survey year,
the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the home rule authorities of
Illinois municipalities.
In Dunne v. County of Cook, 192 the Illinois Supreme Court considered the authority of the Cook County Board of Commissioners
(the "Board") to adopt an ordinance altering the vote necessary to
override the veto of the president of the Board. Specifically, the
Board enacted an ordinance that reduced from four-fifths to threefifths the majority required to override the president's veto. 193 The
plaintiff in Dunne contended that this ordinance violated section
6(f) of article VII of the Illinois Constitution by altering
the "form
94
referendum.
by
approval
without
government"
of
In determining whether the ordinance effected an alteration in
the "form of government" within the meaning of section 6(f), the
court reasoned that reducing the vote necessary to override the
Board president's veto diminished the power of the president while
augmenting the power of the Board. The Dunne court held that
this shift was equivalent to changing the "form of government."' 95
Thus, the Dunne court concluded that absent submission to approval by referendum, as required by section 6(f), the ordinance
96
was invalid.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Dunne cited an observation made
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
190. Id. at art. IV, § 13.
191. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (5th ed. 1979).
192. 108 Ill. 2d 161, 483 N.E.2d 13 (1985).
193. Id. at 163, 483 N.E.2d at 14.
194. Id. at 163-64, 483 N.E.2d at 14. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(f). Article VII,
section 6(f) provides in relevant part: "[a] home rule unit shall have the power subject to
approval by referendum to adopt, alter or repeal a form of government provided by
law .. "
195. Dunne, 108 Ill. 2d at 166, 483 N.E.2d at 15 (1985).
196. Id. at 167, 483 N.E.2d at 15.
189.
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in the appellate court's dissenting opinion. The appellate court's
dissent explained that the original reason for requiring the fourfifths veto override was to insure that the votes of commissioners
representing the area outside of Chicago were not dominated by
the votes of those from within Chicago. 97 Thus, the supreme
court indeed may have been pursuaded by the resulting disadvantage to commissioners from outside of Chicago.
The decision in Dunne may result in heightened judicial awareness of decisions that disadvantage one group of elected officials
and their constituents. In the future, disputes involving entities
subject to joint jurisdiction may be resolved in a manner that maintains a balance between the relative voting strengths of the various
constituencies represented. Thus, litigation concerning McCormick Place Convention Center, which is subject to state and local
jurisdiction, and litigation regarding O'Hare Airport, which is subject to state, county, and local jurisdiction, could invite similar balancing considerations.
The second case that the Illinois Supreme Court addressed concerning home rule authority was Leck v. Michaelson. "98 In Leck,
as in Dunne, article VII, section 6(f) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution was at issue.
In Leck, the Village of Lansing had passed a referendum pursuant to section 6(f) which required a run-off election for any Village
office for which no candidate received fifty percent of the votes
cast.1 99 After a Village election, the plaintiffs, registered voters in
the Village of Lansing, brought suit to compel the Cook County
Board of Elections to conduct a run-off election for two Village
trustee positions for which no candidate received fifty percent of
the vote.2°° The plaintiffs claimed that such a run-off election was
required pursuant to the referendum and subsequently enacted Village ordinance.2 ° '
197. Id. at 164-65, 483 N.E.2d at 14. When the statute requiring a four-fifths veto
override was passed, there were fifteen commissioners, ten from Chicago, and five from
the suburbs. Thus, a three-fifths vote would have permitted the ten Chicago commissioners to override vetoes of a president from the suburbs, leaving the suburban commissioners without a voice in the override veto. Id. at 164, 483 N.E.2d at 14.
198. 111 Ill. 2d 523, 491 N.E.2d 414 (1986).
199. Id. at 525-26, 491 N.E.2d at 414-15. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(f). Article
VII, section 6(f) provides in relevant part, that home rule units may "adopt, alter or
repeal a form of government" by referendum and "[a] home rule municipality shall have
the power to provide for its officers, their manner of selection and terms of office only as
approved by referendum or as otherwise authorized by law."
200. Leck, 111 Ill. 2d at 525, 491 N.E.2d at 414-15.
201. Id.
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The defendants, the Cook County Board of Elections, challenged the constitutionality of the run-off election system.2 "2 The
defendants noted that the referendum proposition was not self-executing and the ordinance that was passed to implement the proposition contained reforms not included in the proposition.
Accordingly, the defendants argued, because the ordinance's reforms were not passed by referendum, they violated the home rule
provision which requires approval by referendum when a home
rule unit alters its "form of government" by changing the manner
of selecting its officers.2 "3
In evaluating the referendum proposition and the ordinance, the
Leck court addressed a number of issues regarding the run-off election system that had been left unresolved by the referendum proposition and ordinance. 20 4 First, the terms of the proposition did not
indicate how or when a run-off election would be held.20 5 A later

run-off election automatically would change the lengths of the
terms of office for the trustees to be elected and the departing trustees. 20 6 Although the unavoidable change in the lengths of the
terms of office was not considered in the proposition, the court
noted that it was a change in the "form of government" and thus
20 7
subject to voter approval under the home rule authority.
The Leck court also observed a number of conflicts between the
ordinance and the proposition.2 8 Finally, the court held that the
1979 Lansing proposition was fatally defective under article VII,
section 6(f) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution because of its ambiguity and vagueness. 20 9 Thus, the court refused to compel a run-off

election under the proposition and ordinance.210
The decision in Leck v. Michaelson must be considered by any
home rule unit changing its election process. As the court noted,
"[t]he Lansing referendum illustrates the mischief that may result
from a proposition that initiates a change in the election process
without adequately working through and articulating the details of
'2 11
the new scheme.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 525, 491 N.E.2d at 415.
Id. at 528, 491 N.E.2d at 416.
Id. at 528-30, 491 N.E.2d at 416-17.
Id. at 528-29, 491 N.E.2d at 416.
Id. at 529, 491 N.E.2d at 416.
Id. See ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(f).
Leck, 111 Il1. 2d at 529, 491 N.E.2d at 416.
Id. at 531, 491 N.E.2d at 417.
Id.
Id.
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In Royal Liquor Mart, Inc. v. City of Rockford,21 2 the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Second District determined that a sales tax
enacted by a municipality under its home rule authority remained
valid following the repeal of the municipality's home rule status.
The plaintiffs, retailers who paid the sales tax, sued the city of
Rockford to enjoin it from collecting the sales tax and to recover
all such taxes paid to the city after April 14, 1983.21 They argued
that the sales tax ordinance which had been enacted under Rockford's home rule authority became invalid when Rockford repealed
its home rule powers in a referendum held April 12, 1983 and certified on April 14, 1983.214
The sales tax ordinance originally was passed in order to fund
the "operating deficit" of the Rockford "Metro Center" exposition
building, thereby guaranteeing the operation of the "Metro
Center" building authority while the original bonds that provided
the capital for the project were outstanding." 5 The ordinance was
scheduled to constitute a levy for either twenty years or until the
retiring of all bonds issued for the "Metro Center" and supported
by state funding, whichever occurred later.2"6
The appellate court in Royal Liquor affirmed the circuit court's
decision and upheld the validity of the tax.21 7 The court reasoned
that if an act by a municipality under its home rule authority could
be invalidated by the repeal of home rule powers, a home rule municipality would be unable to make long term commitments.2 8
Moreover, the court noted that an invalidation of acts of a former
home rule municipality upon repeal of home rule authority, would
lead to unpredictability in the laws created while the municipality
enjoyed home rule.219
The Royal Liquor court also reasoned that a tax's validity is determined at the time the tax is levied 220 and the later repeal of
home rule does not affect the tax's validity. 22 ' Because the plaintiffs cited no clear authority in support of their argument, the
Royal Liquor court held that they failed to establish the invalidity
212. 133 Ill. App. 3d 868, 479 N.E.2d 485 (2d Dist. 1985).
213. Id. at 869, 479 N.E.2d at 486.
214. Id. See also ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(b). Article VII, section 6(b) provides that
"[a] home rule unit by referendum may elect not to be a home rule unit."
215. Royal Liquor, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 872, 479 N.E.2d at 488.
216. Id. at 876, 479 N.E.2d at 490-91.
217. Id. at 869, 479 N.E.2d at 486.
218. Id. at 875-76, 479 N.E.2d at 490.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 876, 479 N.E.2d at 490-91.
221. Id.
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of the tax.222
B.

Special Legislation

The special legislation provision of the 1970 Illinois Constitution 223 prohibits the General Assembly from passing special or local laws "when a general law is or can be made applicable.

' 224

The

purpose of this provision is "to prevent the enlargement of the
rights of one or more persons and the impairment of, or discrimination against, the rights of others.

'2 25

The provision, however,

does not prohibit classifications in legislation if there is a reasonable basis for the classification and the classification bears a reasonable relation to the evil sought to be corrected and the purpose
sought to be achieved.226
In In re Belmont Fire Protection District,227 the Illinois Supreme

Court considered whether "An Act to add section 19a to An Act
in relation to fire protection districts" (the "Act") 228 violated the
provision prohibiting special legislation. The Act authorized consolidation of fire protection services within a municipality into a
single fire protection district for the purpose of remedying perceived dangers of multiple fire protection districts serving one municipality. 229 The Act was applicable to municipalities within
counties having populations of more than 600,000 people but less
than 1,000,000 people. 230 The only county in Illinois fitting this
population classification was DuPage County.
The petitioners, fire protection districts, challenged the population provision of the Act. The petitioners argued that the population classification was not based on any rational difference of
situation in DuPage County, nor was it rationally related to the
object and purpose of the legislation.2 1 The petitioners claimed
that although DuPage County was the only county in Illinois falling into this population category, municipalities in other counties
222.

Id. at 876, 479 N.E.2d at 491.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
224. Id. The special legislation section states, in relevant part: "[t]he General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable."
Id.
225. See Gaca v. City of Chicago, 411 111. 146, 148-49, 103 N.E.2d 617, 619 (1952)
(referring to the same provision in the 1870 Illinois Constitution).
226. Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 Ill. 2d 103, 112, 281 N.E.2d 317, 322 (1972).
227. 111 Ill. 2d 373, 489 N.E.2d 1385 (1986).
228. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1271/2, para. 38.2a (1985).
229. Belmont Fire, 111 Ill. 2d at 376, 489 N.E.2d at 1386.
230. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1271,, para. 38.2(a) (1985).
231. Belmont Fire, 111 Ill. 2d at 377, 489 N.E.2d at 1387.
223.
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also were being served by multiple fire protection districts.232
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Act violated the special
legislation provision. 233 The court reasoned that there was no substantial difference between DuPage County's multiple fire district
situation and other counties with municipalities having multiple
fire protection districts.234 On this basis, the court held that there
was no reasonable basis for the population classification in the
legislation.235
Furthermore, the court in In re Belmont Fire Protection District
found that the population classification did not bear a rational relationship to the purpose of the Act and the evil it sought to correct.236 The court was unable to find a rational relationship
between the requirement that a county have a population of
600,000 to 1,000,000 and the desirability of consolidating fire protection districts within a given municipality into a single fire protection district. 237 Because the population classification of the Act
was arbitrary and unreasonable, the court held that it violated the
special legislation provision of the Illinois Constitution.23 s
VII.

LEGISLATION

During the Survey year, the Illinois General Assembly passed
several bills pertaining to state and local governments. Two pieces
of legislation are discussed in this article; one concerning enterprise
zones and the other concerning public employees' workers compensation claims.
In Public Act 84-166, which was approved and became effective
August 16, 1985, the General Assembly created "An Act in Relation to Enterprise Zones" (the "Act").23 9 The Act amends a
number of Illinois statutes in order to create financial incentives for
businesses to locate in designated areas in Illinois.24°
The first section of the Act amends paragraph 8-11-2 of the Illinois Municipal Code. 24 1 Paragraph 8-11-2 provides that municipalities may tax "gross receipts" of public utilities. The
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 381, 489 N.E.2d at 1389.
Id. at 386, 489 N.E.2d at 1391.
Id. at 382, 489 N.E.2d at 1389.
Id. at 383, 489 N.E.2d at 1390.
Id.
Id. at 383-84, 489 N.E.2d at 1390.
Id. at 386, 489 N.E.2d at 1391.
1985 Ill. Laws 84-166.
Id.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-11-2 (1983).
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amendment provides that a municipality, by majority vote of its
corporate authorities, may elect to exclude from "gross receipts"
the consideration received by public utilities from business enterprises that are exempt under the Act.242 The amendment further
explains that in order for a business enterprise to be eligible for
exemption, it must either make investments that in effect create at
least 200 full-time jobs in Illinois or make investments that cause
the retention of at least 2,000 full-time jobs in Illinois.243 The business enterprise, however, must also be located in an enterprise
zone, as established by the Illinois Enterprise Zone Act, 2" and certified by the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs
(the "Department"). 245 The second section of the Act amends the
Illinois Enterprise Zone Act 246 to provide that no more than twelve
Enterprise Zones may be certified by the Department in the calendar year 1985.247
The third section of the Act amends "An Act Concerning Public
Utilities," an act which subsequently has been retititled "The Public Utilities Act, '24 8 to provide that a public utility may not pass on
municipal taxes imposed upon the public utility to the business enterprise that qualifies as exempt.24 9 The amendment also repeats
the requirements for a business enterprise to qualify as exempt
from charges added to utility bills as a "pass-on" of the municipal
and state utility taxes.2
The fourth section of the Act amends that section of the Illinois
Income Tax Act 25' which provides an investment credit for taxpayers who invest in property within an enterprise zone. The amendment permits a credit for partnerships and corporations that have
made an election under section 1362 of the Internal Revenue
Code.252 If the credit exceeds the party's tax liability for that year,
242. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-11-2(4)(d), (e) (1985).
243. Id.
244. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 671/2, paras. 601-617 (1985).
245. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 8-11-2(4)(e) (1985).
246. ILL. REV. STAT. ch 671/2, paras. 601-617 (1985).
247. Id. at para. 608(d). Section (d) has been subsequently amended. The amended
section provides that "[t]he Department may also designate up to 2 additional Enterprise
Zones outside the regular application cycle if warranted by the extreme economic circumstances as determined by the Department." Id.
248. "An Act Concerning Public Utilities" was repealed by Public Act 84-617, § 6,
and reenacted and renumbered in the same form by Public Act 84-617, § 1. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1112/3, paras. 1-101 to 14-110 (1985).
249. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/3, paras. 9-222, 9-222.1 (1985).
250. Id. at para. 9-221.
251. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 1-101 to 17-701 (1985).
252. Id. at para. 2-201(h)(1).
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to the party's tax
the excess may be carried forward and applied
253
liability of the five taxable years that follow.

Also within the fourth section, the Act provides for a jobs tax
credit for taxpayers conducting trades or businesses in an enterprise zone. Specifically, the Act allows for a $500 credit per "eligible employee" hired to work in the enterprise zone. 254 The Act
defines an "eligible employee" as an employee who is certified by
the Department of Commerce and Community Affairs as a "dislocated worker" pursuant to Title III of the Job Training Partnership Act,255 one who is hired after the enterprise zone was
designated or the business was located in the enterprise zone, and
one who is employed in the enterprise zone for at least thirty hours
per week. The Act requires that the taxpayer hire five "eligible
employees" to work in the enterprise zone for at least 180 consecutive days. 6 If the credit exceeds the taxpayer's tax liability for
that year,
it may be carried forward for the five taxable years that
257
follow.

The fifth section of the Act amends the Retailers' Occupation
Tax Act. 258 The amendment provides that proceeds from the sale

of building materials by a retailer whose place of business is within
a county or municipality with an enterprise zone, to a purchaser
who will use the materials in real estate in the enterprise zone,2 is
9
exempt from municipal and county retailers' occupation taxes.
The final three sections of the Act amend the Messages Tax
Act, 2" the Gas Revenue Tax Act,2 61 and the Public Utilities Revenue Act.262 The amendments exclude from "gross receipts" the
consideration received from business enterprises that qualify for
the public utilities exemptions.263
The objective of this legislation is to exempt from taxation utilities servicing business enterprises which make investments that
either create or retain jobs in Illinois. Because, as a practical matter, utilities' cost increases and taxes are sometimes passed onto the
utilities consumer, a utilities tax exemption will benefit those utility
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id. at para. 2-201(i).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1658 (1982).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2-201(i) (1985).
Id.
Id. at para. 440.
Id. at paras. 441, 444k.
Id. at paras. 467-467.15.
Id. at paras. 467.16-.30.
Id. at paras. 468-481a.
Id. at paras. 467.1, 467.16, 468.
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users who create or retain jobs. In anticipation of this, the third
section of this Act prohibits the passing on of municipal taxes from
the utility to a business enterprise which qualifies as exempt under
the Act.
The second piece of legislation relating to state and local governments passed during the Survey year is entitled "An Act to Amend
the Law Concerning Matters Related to the Employment of State
Employees" (the "Act"). 264 The Act amends the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois, 265 the Personnel Code 266 and "An Act in Relation to State Finance. ' 267 The Act provides the Department of

Central Management Services with more authority to handle workers' compensation claims.
The first section of the Act amends the Civil Administrative
Code of Illinois to empower the Department of Central Management Services to "[e]stablish rules, procedures and forms" to be
utilized in paying workers' compensation claims. 26 This amendment also grants the Department of Central Management Services
the authority to evaluate and determine the compensability of any
claims.269
The next section of the Act amends the Personnel Code 270 to

exempt hearing officers of the Human Rights Commisssion from
jurisdictions A, B, and C of the Personnel Code. 27 1 The Act also

removes all unskilled positions from partial exemption from jurisdictions A, B, and C of the Personnel Code.272 Additionally, in
this section, the Act amends the Personnel Code to provide that
the rules promulgated by the Director of the Department of Central Management Services shall have the force and effect of law
merely by complying with requirements of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act and filing with the Secretary of State.273 In accordance with this change, the Act deletes the previous extensive
264. 1985 Il.Laws 84-243.
265. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, paras. 1-36.3 (1985).
266. Id. at paras. 63b101-63b119j.
267. Id. at paras. 137-167.
268. Id. at para. 63b4(j).
269. Id.
270. Id. at paras. 63b101-63bl19j.
271. Id. at para. 63b104c(19). The Department of Central Management Services has
three areas of personnel jurisdiction: Jurisdiction A is for "classification and compensation of positions in the State service," Jurisdiction B is for "positions in the State service
to which persons must hold appointments on the basis of merit and fitness," Jurisdiction
C is for "conditions of employment of State service." Id. at para. 63b104a.
272. Id. at para. 63b104d(4). See supra note 271.
273. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, at para. 63b108 (1985).
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procedure by which such rules became law. 274

The final section of the Act amends "An Act in Relation to State
Finance" 275 to permit the Department of Central Management
Services to transfer any amounts appropriated for the payment of
workers' compensation claims to any other "expenditure object"
when the amounts exceed the amount necessary to pay the
claims.276 The Act authorizes the Department of Central Management Services to handle workers' compensation claims: a measure
which will streamline state government expenses.
Throughout several cases in this article, the Illinois courts'
objectives have been to control rising costs and liabilities of governmental units. The Act also attempts to reduce costs by authorizing
the Department of Central Management Services to establish rules
for more efficient administration of workers' compensation claims.
The central processing and initial evaluation of claims should expedite processing of such claims. The centralized establishment and
implementation of uniform rules and procedures, to be used by all
state agencies in the processing of workers compensation claims,
should result in more consistent decisions regarding claims. In
sum, the amendments should improve the administration of
worker's compensation claims and simultaneously reduce costs.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

During the Survey year, the Illinois Courts and General Assembly addressed a number of issues affecting state and local governments. The courts and legislature considered governmental
immunities, municipal issues, rights and benefits of public employees, enterprise zones, and a number of constitutional issues.
Although the issues the courts and legislature addressed varied
greatly, the law created has a consistent theme. The courts and
legislature repeatedly sought to reduce costs for state and local
governments, while encouraging the efficient provision of governmental services.

274. Id.
275. Id. at paras. 137-1676.
276. Id. at para. 149.2.

